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Abstract
Researchers have long recognized that the non-random sorting of individuals into
groups generates correlation between individual and group attributes that is likely to
bias naı̈ve estimates of both individual and group effects. This paper proposes a nonparametric strategy for identifying these effects in a model that allows for both individual
and group unobservables, applying this strategy to the estimation of neighborhood effects
on labor market outcomes. The first part of this strategy is guided by a robust feature of the
equilibrium in the canonical vertical sorting model of Epple and Platt (1998), that there is a
monotonic relationship between neighborhood housing prices and neighborhood quality.
This implies that under certain conditions a non- parametric function of neighborhood
housing prices serves as a suitable control function for the neighborhood unobservable
in the labor market outcome regression. The second part of the proposed strategy uses
aggregation to develop suitable instruments for both exogenous and endogenous group
attributes. Instrumenting for each individuals observed neighborhood attributes with the
average neighborhood attributes of a set of observationally identical individuals eliminates the portion of the variation in neighborhood attributes due to sorting on unobserved
individual attributes. The neighborhood effects application is based on confidential microdata from the 1990 Decennial Census for the Boston MSA. The results imply that the
direct effects of geographic proximity to jobs, neighborhood poverty rates, and average
neighborhood education are substantially larger than the conditional correlations identified using OLS, although the net effect of neighborhood quality on labor market outcomes
remains small. These findings are robust across a wide variety of specifications and robustness checks.
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1 Introduction
Economists often examine economic behavior and outcomes in empirical settings in
which individuals have non-randomly sorted into groups. Examples include schools, residential
neighborhoods, occupations, interpersonal relationships, correctional and treatment programs. In
attempting to separately identify the impact of individual versus group attributes on individual
outcomes, researchers have long recognized that this non-random sorting generates correlation
between individual and group attributes some of which are likely to be unobserved. Because the
associated biases are likely to be especially severe in the estimation of social interactions (peer
effects) among individuals in the same reference group, the identification problems created by
endogenous group formation have received extensive attention in that literature (Manski (1993),
Moffitt (2001), Brock and Durlauf (2001)).
In this paper, we consider the general problem of identifying the effect of individual and
group attributes on individual outcomes in a model that allows for both individual and group
unobservables. When both types of unobservables are present, the identification problem created
by non-random sorting is especially severe because, as in Epple (1987), any variable that affects
sorting over groups will generally, by construction, be correlated with either the individual or
group unobservable (or both).2 As a result, many common empirical strategies that are designed
to deal with the presence of one type of unobservable often neglect the presence of the other,
thereby either not addressing or possibly even exacerbating the corresponding biases.
To see this, consider a specific estimation technique that is used commonly in the
literature: the inclusion of group fixed effects in the individual outcome regression. While it is
often argued that this approach eliminates any biases resulting from across-group sorting, thereby
providing unbiased estimates of the effect of observable individual attributes, this is not generally
the case. The problem is that non-random sorting generally induces correlation between observed
and unobserved individual attributes within groups. In a selective hiring or matching process
(e.g., teachers to schools, individuals to colleges, doctors to residency programs, individuals to
occupations), for example, the total ability of individuals that sort into the same group is likely to
be comparable leading to negative within-group correlation between observed and unobserved
measures of individual ability, even if these measures are uncorrelated in the population. In such
2

As we discuss in greater detail below, the identification problem induced by the presence of two types of
unobservables in our model bears a close resemblance to the identification problem in hedonic models
described by Epple (1987). In that case, Epple showed that the equilibrium matching of suppliers to
consumers along the hedonic gradient ensured that unobservable attributes from both the demand- and
supply-side of the problem enter the estimating equation, thereby making classic instruments derived from
the opposite side of the market inappropriate and the identification essentially impossible with
observational data.
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cases, the inclusion of group fixed effects would generally lead to an attenuation bias in the
estimated effect of observed individual attributes.3 More generally, the use of group fixed effects
does nothing to specifically address biases that arise when sorting is driven in part by unobserved
individual attributes.
To address the identification problem induced by the presence of both individual and
group unobservables in an outcome regression, we offer a non-parametric solution that is
grounded in the canonical vertical model of sorting developed in Epple and Platt (1998) and
Epple and Sieg (1999).4 To make the discussion of the identification problem and our proposed
empirical methodology concrete, we consider a specific application: the estimation of effect of
neighborhood attributes on labor market outcomes.
We begin the paper by using the structure of the sorting equilibrium in the Epple-PlattSieg (EPS) model to highlight the correlations that are induced when individuals sort across
neighborhoods on the basis of both individual and neighborhood unobservables. We then present
our identification strategy, which consists of two distinct parts. We begin by exploiting a robust
implication of the sorting equilibrium in the EPS model, namely that there is a monotonic
relationship between neighborhood housing prices and neighborhood quality. Under conditions
that we make explicit below, this implies that a non-parametric function of neighborhood housing
prices serves as a suitable control function for the neighborhood unobservable in the labor market
outcome regression.5 6 By including this control function in the labor market outcome regression,
we eliminate the correlation between the group component of the error term and the individual
attributes included in the regression. This strategy implements the general observation made in
Brock and Durlauf (2006) that a control function can be used to deal with the group unobservable
in an individual outcome equation.7
3

It is not uncommon to see groups fixed effects used in estimation for environments where sorting across
groups is expected. For example, the inclusion of occupation fixed effects in wage regressions, school
fixed effects in models of teacher productivity, or neighborhood fixed effects in models of housing prices.
4
This model and its predecessors has been used or extended in theoretical settings by Epple, Filimon, and
Romer, (1984, 1993), Epple and Romer (1991), Epple and Romano (1999), Fernandez and Rogerson (1996,
1998) and Benabou (1993, 1996) and applied in empirical settings by Epple, Romer, and Sieg (2001), Sieg,
Smith, Banzhaf, and Walsh (2004), Walsh (2005) among others. See Ross and Yinger (1999) for a review
of papers that apply this sorting model within local public finance.
5
Note that monotonic relationship may not hold explicitly once one allows for horizontal sorting as in the
models developed by Nechyba (1997, 1999), Bayer, McMillan, and Rueben (2005), Bayer and Timmins
(2005, 2006), Ferreira (2003) and Ferryera (2003).
6
In addition to the residential sorting context, this solution should be applicable in any setting where the
price of entry into a group is available (e.g., wages, college tuition) or where groups can be quality rankordered in some way.
7
Ioannides and Zabel (2004) use such a control function in their work on housing demand. It is the
specific idea to use neighborhood housing price as a control function for unobserved neighborhood quality
in an individual outcome equation that is new here. Also, note that the use of price as a control function
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The second part of our strategy is designed to address the likely correlation of unobserved
individual attributes with observed group attributes (including the housing price control function)
and follows a more traditional IV approach. To break this correlation, we assign each individual
in the sample to a cell based on her observable characteristics and instrument for each
individual’s own neighborhood attributes with the average neighborhood attributes of those
individuals in the same cell.

Averaging neighborhood attributes over all observationally

equivalent individuals removes any idiosyncratic portion of the sorting of individuals into
neighborhoods associated with an individual’s unobservable attributes. Notice also, that this
approach amounts to using a fully non-parametric sorting model to predict each individual’s
neighborhood attributes given her observable characteristics. Brock and Durlauf (2001, 2002,
2005) have recommended the use of such non-linearities arising from discrete choices for
identification in models of social interactions.8 9
For our neighborhood effects application, we use the confidential Long Form data from
the 1990 Decennial Census for the Boston Metropolitan Statistical Area. In examining the impact
of neighborhoods on labor market outcomes, we focus on the influence of spatial access to jobs
and neighborhood socioeconomic characteristics on individual labor market outcomes. These
neighborhood attributes have received a great deal of attention in the previous literature. We
estimate models for six different labor market outcomes, a number of subsamples based on
education, gender, and family structure, and a variety of empirical specifications designed to
isolate the impact of each of the three parts of our proposed identification strategy.
Our results imply that the direct impact of geographic proximity to jobs, neighborhood
poverty rates, and college-educated neighbors is substantially larger than the conditional
correlations identified using OLS.

These findings are robust across a wide variety of

specifications and robustness checks. Interestingly, while geographic proximity and
neighborhood poverty rates have the anticipated positive and negative impacts on labor market
outcomes respectively, exposure to college-educated neighbors also has a significant negative
effect. We discuss potential explanations for this finding below. Thus, taken together, our results
imply that the relationship between neighborhood attributes and labor market outcomes is quite
complex and as a whole our results are consistent with small and even negative net effects of
has also appeared in the differentiated products demand literature in Petrin and Train (2005), although it is
used there primarily as a computational tool in a standard instrumental variables context.
8
Also see Bayer and Timmins (2006) and in the context of the identification of hedonic models by
Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim (2004), Bajari and Benkhard (2005) and Bajari and Kahn (2005).
9
In addition to the two-part strategy outlined here, we also address additional issues related to
neighborhood attributes endogenously determined by the sorting process (e.g., neighborhood
socioeconomic characteristics) below.
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improving neighborhood ‘quality’ on the labor market outcomes. The finding of small net effects
of neighborhood is primarily driven by the negative effect of college-educated neighbors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a broader review
of the neighborhood effects literature. Section 3 presents a simple version of the canonical
vertical sorting model of Epple and Platt (1998) and Epple and Sieg (1999) and examines the
resulting biases in ordinary least squares analyses of the effect of individual and group attributes
on individual outcomes. Section 4 presents our three-part estimation strategy for obtaining
consistent estimates in the presence of both individual and group unobserved attributes. Section 5
discusses the data, sample, and specification of variables used to describe households and
neighborhoods. Section 6 presents the results and Section 7 concludes.
2. Neighborhood Effects and Labor Market Outcomes – Previous Literature
For the purposes of our analysis two aspects of the previous neighborhood effects
literature are pertinent. First, as we seek to offer a general solution to a core identification
problem in the neighborhood effects literature, we begin by reviewing other recent approaches to
the problem, noting their strengths and limitations.

Second, we then discuss the previous

empirical findings in the literature that relate most directly to our application: the effect of
neighborhood on labor market outcomes.
Identifying Neighborhood Effects. The study of the identification of neighborhood effects is a
difficult problem without a completely general solution. An important line of recent research
seeks to identify neighborhood effects by isolating a random component of neighborhood choice
induced by special social experiments. Popkin et al. (1993) pioneered this approach using data
from the Gautreaux Program conducted in Chicago in the late 1970's, which gave housing
vouchers to eligible black families in public housing as part of a court-imposed public housing
de-segregation effort. Similarly, Oreopolous (2003) and Jacob (2005) study the impact of relocations arising from administrative assignment to public housing projects in Toronto and from
the demolition of the public housing projects in Chicago, respectively. Most notably, Katz et. al.
(2001) and Ludwig et al. (2001) have used the randomized housing voucher allocation associated
with the Moving To Opportunity demonstration (MTO) to examine the impact of re-location to
neighborhoods with much lower poverty rates on a very wide set of individual behavioral
outcomes including health, labor market activity, crime, education, and more. Especially in the
case of MTO, the advantages of this approach are clear – the randomization inherent in the
program design ensures a clean comparison of treatment and proper control groups.

4

There are, however, important limitations in the extent to which the treatment effects
identified through re-location are informative about the nature of general forms of neighborhood
effects per se. First, individuals studied must be eligible for a re-location program in the first
place; this typically implies that the resulting sample is special (i.e. so as to be a resident in public
housing) and may not be as sensitive to neighborhood effects as other individuals. Second, the
experimental design involves re-location to new neighborhoods that are, by design, very different
from baseline neighborhoods; this implies that the identified treatment effect measures the impact
of re-locating to a neighborhood where individuals initially have few social contacts and where
the individuals studied may be very different than the average resident of the new neighborhood.
In this way, the treatment effects identified with this design are necessarily a composite of several
factors related to significant changes in neighborhoods that are not easily disentangled (see
Moffitt (2001) for a detailed discussion).
A second broad approach seeks to deal with the difficulties induced by correlation in
unobserved attributes at the neighborhood level by aggregating to a higher level of geography.
Evans, Oates, and Schwab (1992), Cutler and Glaeser (1997), Ross (1998), Weinberg (2000,
2004), Ross and Zenou (2004), and Card and Rothstein (2005) identify the effect of location on
outcomes using cross-metropolitan variation. For example, Cutler and Glaeser (1997) analyze the
impact of segregation within a metropolitan area on a variety of outcomes including education,
labor market activity, and teenage fertility, and Evans, Oates and Schwab use metropolitan area
poverty rates as an instrument for neighborhood level poverty. Again, the advantages of this
approach are clear – aggregation certainly eliminates the problem of correlation in unobservables
among neighbors (although potential correlation in unobservables at the metropolitan level
becomes an issue). The effects identified through aggregation, however, include not only the
average neighborhood effects operating in a metropolitan area but also any broader consequences
of living in a segregated or high poverty metropolitan area.10 Thus, the strict interpretation of the
estimated effects as neighborhood effects requires the assumption that metropolitan segregation
does not directly affect outcomes.11
A third approach is offered in Bayer, Ross, and Topa (2005), which uses detailed Census
microdata to isolate block-level variation in the characteristics of neighbors within narrowlydefined neighborhoods. The key identifying assumption underlying this design is that there is no
10

More residentially segregated metropolitan areas might be associated, for example, with increased racial
taste-based discrimination in the labor market, in the application of criminal justice, etc. due to decreased
levels of regular inter-racial contact in residential neighborhoods.
11
It is important to point out that Cutler and Glaeser (1997) do not claim that the effects identified in their
analysis are strictly neighborhood effects.
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block-level correlation in unobserved attributes within block groups, due perhaps to the thinness
of the housing market (i.e., that it is difficult to select the particular block that one would like to
live on). This approach identifies the effect of neighborhood by conditioning on the effect of
location over a broader geographic range (block group).

Accordingly, the methodology is

designed to capture very local social interactions whose influence decays very quickly with
distance.

This approach will not capture effects that arise over broader areas, such as the

influence of employment access or crime rates on employment outcomes.
The Epple-Platt-Sieg style model that we will discuss below provides a useful framework
for understanding these studies. The model below contains two sources of error over which
individuals sort: an individual specific error and a neighborhood specific error. In this context,
traditional instrumental variables analysis often fails.

For example, an instrument for an

individual’s neighborhood attributes must be correlated with neighborhood choice and yet
uncorrelated with either the individual or place unobservable. However, these three requirements
represent a contradiction in a sorting equilibrium. Any variable that is uncorrelated with the
individual unobservable will only be correlated with neighborhood choice if it influences sorting
over place unobservables, but of course this contradicts the assumption that the instrument is
uncorrelated with the place unobservable.12

In experimental studies, residential location is

changed based on a randomly assigned experimental treatment. While in the studies that use
across metropolitan variation or in the study that uses within block group variation, the implied
assumption is that the factors that influence across metropolitan sorting or within block group
sorting are idiosyncratic and orthogonal to the individual and neighborhood unobservables that
influence labor market outcomes.
All of the above studies use an empirical design intended to provide a variable that is
correlated with an individual’s exposure to location attributes for reasons that are independent of
the individual’s sorting behavior (experimental treatment, exogenous residence in metropolitan
areas, or random sorting arising from a thin housing market), but these designs in turn limit the
researchers’ ability to isolate and identify the effects of various neighborhood factors on current
residents. By systematically addressing the sources of sorting bias in a population of current
neighborhood residents, we hope to provide a more detailed and complete picture of the influence
neighborhood on resident outcomes albeit with newly imposed assumptions concerning the
structure of the underlying sorting problem. Specifically, unlike most of the studies above, this
study is intended to capture the overall effect of neighborhood variables on a representative
12

As mentioned earlier, this identification problem is comparable to Epple’s (1987) analysis of
identification in estimating hedonic models.
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population in their equilibrium locations. Moreover, our approach generates a substantial amount
of identifying information for relatively large population-based samples. Therefore, unlike the
studies above that rely on across-metropolitan variation or small experimental samples and so are
only able to examine one or two variables of interest, our study is able to examine the effect of a
larger variety of neighborhood variables on individual outcomes.

The Effect of Neighborhood on Labor Market Outcomes. A wide array of studies have
documented the relationship between various aspects of the neighborhood environment and
employment outcomes. The spatial mismatch hypothesis, first proposed by Kain (1968), has
spawned innumerable studies that find that job access is positively correlated with employment
and/or labor market earnings. Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist (1990) and Raphael (1998), for example,
find that youth residing far from suburban areas where low skill jobs tend to be locatedand where
new jobs tend to be created had worse employment outcomes. Other research has centered on the
impact of the characteristics and behavior of neighbors on labor market outcomes. Case and Katz
(1991), for example, find a correlation between youth idleness and the idleness of neighbors,
while O’Regan and Quigley (1998) find that youth are more likely to be high school dropouts and
unemployed when they reside in high poverty neighborhoods and Weinberg, Reagan and Yankow
(2004) find that people who move to neighborhoods with worse attributes have worse
employment outcomes. 13
Many scholars have suggested job market referrals or information networks as an
important factor behind such neighborhood effects.14 Rees and Schultz (1970), Corcoran et al.
(1980), Holzer (1988), Blau and Robbins (1990), Blau (1992), Granovetter (1995), Addison and
Portugal (2001) and Wahba and Zenou (2003) all document the importance of referrals and other
informal hiring channels in the labor market, using both U.S. and non-U.S. data. A number of
these studies including Holzer (1988) and Blau and Robbins (1990) find that informal referrals
are more productive than more formal methods in terms of job offer and acceptance probabilities.
Additional studies including Datcher (1983), Devine and Kiefer (1991), Marmaros and Sacerdote

13

These papers represent a small sample of very large literatures. For broader surveys of these literatures,
see Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist (1998), Ellen and Turner (1997), and Mayer (1996)
14
The use of informal channels such as referrals by employers can be rationalized as a means to reduce the
uncertainty regarding the quality of a prospective employee. Montgomery (1991) was the first to formally
model a labor market in which both formal and informal hiring channels coexist. Focusing more closely on
the information exchange among workers, Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2002) analyze an explicit
network model of job search in which agents receive random offers and decide whether to use them
themselves or pass them on to their unemployed contacts depending on their own employment status and
current wage.
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(2002), and Loury (2004) find evidence that use of informal networks increases the quality of the
match as captured by job tenure or earnings.15 16
Further, this literature suggests that the effect of referrals varies considerably across
different demographic groups. In terms of intensity of usage, workers with less education and
located in high poverty rate neighborhoods are more likely to use informal contacts (Elliot, 1999),
men use referral networks more intensively than women (Corcoran et al., 1980), and Hispanic
men use networks more intensively than non-Hispanic white men (Smith, 2000).

The

productivity of networks also appear to differ across groups with high success rates observed for
men relative to women (Bortnick and Ports, 1992) and blacks relative to whites (Bortnick and
Ports, 1992; Korenman and Turner, 1996; Holzer (1987). In addition, Bayer, Ross, and Topa
(2004) find that both college educated workers and high school drop-outs benefit less than high
school graduates from block level employment referrals.17 They also find that workers with
children of similar age are more likely to successfully share employment referral information, and
married women are least likely to successfully share employment referral information with each
other.
A relationship between labor market outcomes and neighborhood attributes may exist for
a variety of reasons. The most commonly discussed mechanisms in the literatures cited above
involve information barriers to job search and the significance of informal job market referrals.
Residential locations that are far from employment concentrations or have high concentrations of
individuals who are not strongly attached to the labor market may provide job searchers with little
opportunities for mentoring or for gathering information concerning potential job openings. On
the other hand, a high quality neighborhood may provide the individual with neighborhood
amenities that are complementary to leisure or may expose individuals to lower risk of adverse
events that influence labor market productivity or behavior. For example, Kling, Liebman, Katz,
and Sanbonmatsu (2004) find that moving to a low poverty rate neighborhood improves
themental and physical health of housing voucher recipients inthe Moving to Opportunity Study
(MTO). In fact, the MTO study findings also suggest that there could be multiple mechanisms at
work in the relationship between neighborhood and labor market outcomes.
15

MTO implies

See Elliot (1999) and Loury (2003) for counter examples where the use of informal networks led to lower
wages. Of course, the lower wages may be associated with increased match quality on desirable job
attributes causing the individual to accept a lower wage as a compensating differential.
16
See Ionnides and Loury (2004) for a detailed review of this literature.
17
This finding also is consistent with assortive models of social interactions where non-college graduates
use informal networks intensively, but college graduates are not part of that network. See Bertrand,
Luttmer, and Mullainathan (2000), Aizer and Currie (2004), Arcidiacono and Vigdor (2004), and Weinberg
(2005) for similar examples relating to welfare participation, prenatal care use, social interactions at elite
universities, and social interactions among high school students, respectively.
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substantial neighborhood effects on health for voucher recipients, but no influence on labor
market outcomes while many studies document a positive influence of mental and physical health
on labor market outcomes.18 The results from MTO and studies of health and the labor market
can only be consistent if there are other influences of neighborhood poverty among MTO
recipients that depress labor market activity.
In order to better understand the complex relationship between neighborhood and
outcomes, we first focus on three core variables: employment access drawing on the spatial
mismatch literature, percent poverty which is a standard measure of neighborhood quality, and
percent of college graduates which was intended to proxy for the density of human capital in the
neighborhood, but appears to capture either non-linearities in neighborhood referrals or
unobserved neighborhood amenities that are associated with a demand for leisure. In addition,
we also extend the model to consider the effect of minority and immigrant population shares.
3. Identifying Individual and Group Effects in the Presence of Sorting
This paper posits a world where neighborhoods generate benefits for individuals that
might or might not be reflected in their outcomes and individuals sort across neighborhoods
trading off the benefits offered by each neighborhood against the price required for access to that
neighborhood. In such a world, attributes of both individuals and neighborhoods that affect the
sorting process or outcomes may be unobserved to the econometrician. Most existing research
only explicitly considers either the individual or the location unobservables or does not make a
clear distinction, and yet the interplay of these two unobservables is crucial in understanding the
bias arising in any study of neighborhood effects.
The equation that we are interested in estimating can be written as:
(1)

y ij = β1Z i + β 2 X j + ω i + ξ j + εij

where i indexes individuals, j indexes neighborhoods, yij is the individual outcome of interest, Zi,

ωi, are observed and unobserved individual attributes respectively, and Xj, ξj are observed and
unobserved neighborhood attributes, respectively. While we will explicitly allow for endogenous
neighborhood attributes in our discussion of the empirical strategy in Section 4, it is
expositionally simpler to consider only exogenous attributes here. Specifically, we assume that

18

For some recent examples, See Smith (2003, 1999), Case, Lubotsky, Paxson (2002), Ettner,
Frank, Kessler (1997).
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the covariances between observed and unobserved attributes are equal to zero in the distributions
of individuals and neighborhoods:19

(2)

(i )
(ii)

[

]

E X j ' ξ j = 0;

E[Z i ' ωi ] = 0;

Even when only exogenous attributes are considered in (1), non-random sorting will generally
imply correlation between all individual and neighborhood attributes, thereby creating correlation
between any observed attributes and the composite error term in (1). To see why non-random
sorting gives rise to such correlations, it is helpful to write down a simple version of the EpplePlatt-Sieg model.
A Simple EPS Model of Residential Sorting. Consider a closed metropolitan area consisting of
J neighborhoods with a finite number of houses available in each neighborhood. Exogenous
neighborhood attributes Xj and ξj are distributed such that (2.i) holds. A population of individuals
of total size equal to the total number of house available in the metropolitan area individuals has
individual characteristics Zi and ωi distributed such that (2.ii) holds. Let individuals sort across
neighborhoods trading off between the outcome of interest yij and the price of entering
neighborhood j, pj. Specifically, write individual utility V from choosing neighborhood j as:

(3)

Vij = f (y ij , p j ,ei , µi )

where ei indicates an individual’s initial financial endowment and µi represents an individuals
tastes for the outcome influenced by neighborhood choice, y, versus all other forms consumption,
the price of which is assumed to be independent of the individual’s neighborhood choice. Given
the structure of equation (1), it will be helpful to characterize the neighborhood contribution to
the individual outcome y as:
(4)

θ j = β2 X j + ξ j

19

These assumptions of strict exogeneity are standard in any simple regression estimate of the relationship
between an observed outcomes and control variables. While not uncontroversial, these assumptions seem
reasonable in an analysis intended to examine bias due to sorting.
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It is this neighborhood quality index θj for which individuals will implicitly be willing to pay
higher price of entry pj to enter a given neighborhood j.20
Structure of Equilibrium. Decisions in an EPS-style model are driven by the trade-off between
consuming more of the neighborhood (influenced) good y and the price of entry into the
neighborhood p. As p increases the individual has less money available for the consumption of
all other (non-neighborhood) goods. In equilibrium, the price of entry into each neighborhood
adjusts so as to ration the quality of the neighborhood good θj available there.
To derive predictions about the structure of the equilibrium, it is helpful to make the
following single-crossing properties on preferences:

(5)

d2p
< 0;
dy de

d2p
< 0;
dy dµ

The first of these single-crossing properties implies that as an individual’s financial endowment
increases, the slope of the indifference curve between the price of entry into the neighborhood p
and the consumption of the neighborhood good y decreases, ceteris paribus.

The second

condition implies that the same holds when an individual’s preferences for the neighborhood
good increases.
Given these single-crossing assumptions, Epple-Platt (1998) demonstrates that a sorting
equilibrium exists and can be characterized by two properties that are relevant for our analysis.
The first property is actually a pair of stratification conditions: that (i) conditional on tastes,
individuals are perfectly stratified across neighborhoods on the basis of their initial financial
endowment e and (ii) conditional on initial financial endowment, individuals are perfectly
stratified across neighborhoods on the basis of tastes, µ. These stratification properties can be
seen in the following graphical depiction of an EPS equilibrium:

20

In Section 4 below, we consider generalizations of this simple EPS model to cases where individuals
value more about neighborhoods than the direct effect of neighborhood on our outcome of interest.
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Figure 1: Stratification of Individuals Across Neighborhoods in EPS Equilibrium

ei
J

J-1

É
2

1

i

Figure 1 depicts how individuals sort themselves across neighborhoods with increasing values of
the neighborhood good θJ >θJ-1 > ... >θ2 >θ1. The vertical axis indicates an individual’s value of
the initial financial endowment e, while the horizontal axis depicts an individual’s taste for the
outcome influenced by neighborhood choice, y. The diagonal lines in the figure characterize the
boundary in e-µ space that divide the set of individuals that choose one neighborhood versus the
other (these boundaries need not be parallel or even straight lines). Finally, for expositional
purposes, the graph is drawn assuming a finite support for both tastes and endowments although
this is not required.
The stratification result in income can be seen in Figure 1 by considering households with
a given value of the taste parameter µ and moving vertically across neighborhoods. In this case,
any individual A with endowment greater than individual B (eA > eB) chooses a neighborhood
with at least as great a value of θ.

Likewise, the stratification result in tastes can be seen by

conditioning on income and moving horizontally across neighborhoods. In this case, any
individual A with tastes greater than individual B (µA > µB) chooses a neighborhood with at least
as great a value of θ. Notice more generally, that not only are endowments and tastes positively
correlated across neighborhoods, but they are negatively correlated within neighborhoods. That
is, conditioning on a particular neighborhood the individuals with the highest endowments
systematically have the lowest expected level of tastes and vice versa.
Returning to our main estimating equation (1), the key insights that the EPS model
provides regarding the resulting correlation between observed and unobserved attributes on the
right hand side can be seen if we assume that individual tastes µ are positively correlated with

12

both observed and unobserved productive individual attributes: Zi, ωi. Specifically, assuming
that:
(6)

E[µ i 'ωi ] > 0 and

β1 E[µi ' Z i ]> 0

In this case, the structure of the EPS equilibrium implies two key conditions:

(7)

(i )
(ii)

[ ]
E[µ 'θ ]> 0

E µ i 'θ j > 0 ⇒
i

j

⇒

β1 E[Z i 'θ j ]> 0 ⇒ β1 E[Z i 'ξ j ]> 0;

β 2 E[µi ' X j ]> 0 ⇒ β 2 E[ωi ' X j ]> 0;

Condition (7.i) implies that productive observable individual attributes are positively correlated
with unobserved neighborhood attributes. Imagine, for example, that an individual’s educational
attainment both positively affected her taste for the neighborhood good and had a positive direct
influence on y.

In this case, we would expect a positive correlation between individual

educational attainment and any unobserved aspects of a neighborhood that contributed to the
production of y. Condition (7.ii) implies that the reverse also holds: that observable neighborhood
attributes are correlated with unobserved individual attributes. Returning to our educational
attainment example, imagine if educational attainment were unobserved. In this case, we would
expect a positive correlation between this unobserved individual attribute and any observed
attributes of a neighborhood that contribute to the production of y.
Another property that follows directly from the EPS model is:

(8)

E [ei ' µi | j ] < 0 ⇒ E [ei 'ωi | j ] < 0

that conditional on neighborhood, endowments and tastes are negatively correlated. From this
correlation, it is easy to understand why including neighborhood fixed effects when estimating
equation (1) does not provide unbiased estimates of either observed individual attributes of the
effect of neighborhood.

That is, when the analysis is restricted to within-neighborhood

comparisons of outcomes, those individuals within a neighborhood observed with the highest
values of observed endowments systematically have lower tastes for the neighborhood good. So,
again, to the extent that individual tastes are positively correlated with individual productivity,
correlation between the observed and unobserved components of equation (1) would remain.
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Broad Estimation Strategy. Our estimation strategy consists of two main parts designed to
break the complex correlation patterns between the observed and unobserved components of
equation (1). As the correlations in (7) and (8) make clear, the sorting bias arising from the
presence of both individual and neighborhood unobservables in equation (1) is substantially more
complex that simple selection problems. For example, if an individual with apparently high tastes
for neighborhood quality based on their observables resides in a apparently low quality
neighborhood based on location observables, the underlying reason for this sorting outcome is
unclear – either the neighborhood has unusually high unobservables or the person has
unobservables associated with a very low preferences for neighborhood quality.
The key insight that we draw from the EPS sorting model in this paper is that this
apparent ambiguity can be resolved by using information on neighborhood prices.

If the

neighborhood in question has a very high price, the natural conclusion is that neighborhood
unobservables are very good, but if the price is low the individual taste unobservables must be
negative. In this way, we will use a flexible function of housing prices as a proxy for the
unobserved portion of neighborhood quality in (1), which reduces the problem to a more
traditional problem arising from selection into neighborhoods based on individual unobservables.
We then address this more traditional selection problem using standard instrumental variable
techniques to break the correlation between neighborhood attributes and individual
unobservables.21
Estimation Strategy - Part I. To illustrate this two-part solution, we begin by considering the
problem described in condition (7.i) above: the correlation of observable individual attributes
with unobserved neighborhood attributes. In this case, it turns out that a second property of the
EPS equilibrium suggests a natural fix.

In particular, EPS prove that neighborhoods with

increasing values of θJ > θJ-1 > ... >θ2 >θ1 are also ordered monotonically in terms of
neighborhood housing prices: pJ >pJ-1 > ... >p2 >p1.
This monotonicity condition implies that there exists a function f such that θ =f(p). Thus,
a non-parametric function of neighborhood housing prices can serve as a perfect control function
for θ in equation (1):

21

This solution requires that the supply elasticity of group openings be constant across groups. In the
neighborhood effects model, the supply elasticity of housing must be constant across neighborhoods, which
suggests that price might not be a suitable control function for an analysis including exurban and rural areas
with high elasticities of supply. In our application, we focus on the Boston Metropolitan Statistical Area,
which is heavily developed with little opportunity for the construction of new housing.
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(9)

y ij = β 1 Z i + f ( p j ) + ωi + ε ij

Given a consistent estimate of f(p), β2 can then be recovered from a simple regression of f(p) on
X:
(10)

fˆ (p j ) = β 2 X j + ξ j

A difficulty remains, however, if equation (9) were estimated via OLS: namely the correlation of
f(pj) with ωi. The remaining correlation between the observed and unobserved portion of equation
(9) is due directly to the stratification result in the EPS model: simply put, individuals with high
tastes for the outcome of interest choose higher quality neighborhoods and, as a result, to the
extent that these tastes are correlated with the direct effect of individual attributes bias the
estimation of equation (9). But this problem is a standard selection problem that can be addressed
by finding an instrument that is correlated with the price of an individual’s neighborhood but not
with the individual’s unobserved attribute. In the next section, we describe our proposed solution
to this problem. The key insight to take away from the analysis of the sorting equilibrium is that
prices can serve as a control function for the neighborhood component of the unobservable in the
outcome equation (1), thereby reducing the identification to the more manageable one of dealing
with a single unobservable.
4.

Estimation Details
As just described, our broad estimation strategy is divided into two main parts: (i)

including a control function based on housing prices in the main estimating equation and (ii)
instrumenting for this control functionand other exogenous neighborhood attributes with variables
that are correlated with the control function but not the individual unobserved attribute ω. In this
section we provide the details of the implementation of these two main parts of the strategy. We
then extend the analysis to allow for endogenous neighborhood attributes such as the
socioeconomic characteristics of one’s neighbors.

Finally, we conclude this section by

considering generalizations of the simple EPS sorting model presented above, discussing the
extent to which the estimation strategy can be extended in those circumstances.
Implementing the Control Function. In practice, we make one key modification when including
a control function in equation (9). Specifically, instead of generating a control function for the
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full neighborhood quality index θ, we instead focus on developing a control function for just the
unobservable, leaving β2Xj in the main estimating equation. Specifically, we estimate a control
function for ξj as the average residual for each neighborhood arising from a simple housing price
equation estimated for the entire metropolitan area. The housing price (pij) can be described by

(11)

pij = δ1Wij + δ 2 X j + λ j + uij

where Wijm is a vector of housing unit attributes. Controlling for housing characteristics absorbs
out any aspect of prices that are explained by housing attributes. We do this because we think
housing attributes are a dimension of prices that are unlikely to contribute directly to labor market
outcomes. We then estimate:
(12)

yij = β1Z i + β 2 X j + β 4 λˆ j + ωi + ε ij

where we must deal directly with the correlation of Xj and λ̂ j with ωi.
Instrumenting for Neighborhood Attributes. To address this correlation we want to instrument
for Xj and λj with a portion of observed neighborhood unobserved attribute that is uncorrelated
with an individual’s own unobserved attribute. We propose to use a function of the average
values of observed neighborhood prices for families with the same observable characteristics Zi as
instruments: E[ X j , λˆ | Z ] . The logic behind these instruments is that (i) the instruments should
be predictive of location because similar individuals should make very similar location choices if
they face the same opportunity set (metropolitan housing market), and (ii) the instruments should
not be correlated with the individual’s unobservable because they are based entirely on individual
observables that have already been included directly in the labor market equation.22
Most individual and family attributes, such as parent’s education, or family size, are
discrete in nature. For the purpose of developing these instruments, we organize individuals into
homogenous cells based on all possible permutations of the discrete observable attributes that
explain an individual’s outcomes in the labor market. Specifically, the mean neighborhood
22

In principle, one might imagine that individuals in the same cell are similar on unobserved features, such
as ability or tastes, so that the cell members location choices are driven by unobservables that are similar to
the unobservables that drive the individual’s location choice. This possibility is ruled out, however, by the
assumption in equation (2) that individual observables are uncorrelated with individual unobservables.
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exposure within an individual’s cell is used to instrument for the individual’s actual exposure to
various neighborhood attributes. The reader should note that an individual’s actual location
attributes are always excluded from the calculation of the cell exposure rates applied to a specific
individual.
A couple of additional features about this instrument are worth noting. First, notice that

E[ X j , λˆ | Z ] are essentially nonparametric predictions of theobserved and unobserved quality of
neighborhood that an individual with a particular set of characteristics Z would choose. In this
way, our IV approach amounts to using a fully non-parametric sorting model to predict each
individual’s neighborhood attributes given her observable characteristics. This empirical strategy
exploits the non-linearities inherent in the sorting process. That such non-linearities could serve
as the basis for identification of individual outcome equations in the presence of sorting has been
key insight of the work by Brock and Durlauf (2001, 2002, 2005) and has been exploited in
closely related work by Bayer and Timmins (2006). Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim (2004),
Bajari and Benkhard (2005) and Bajari and Kahn (2005) use similar sources of identification in
the estimation of hedonic models.
Second, notice that in a single metropolitan housing market this expectation relies on
non-linearities. If Z were allowed to enter (1) completely flexibly, the instrument would contain
no independent variation. In the application that follows, which is based on data from a single
large metropolitan area, the independent variation in our instrument derives from the fact that we
simultaneously use multiple household characteristics to define the cells upon which are
instruments our based. At the same time, we include each type of characteristic (e.g., education,
household structure) only directly in the outcome equation (1). The effect of neighborhood
would be unidentified if the outcome model included a fixed effect for each of cell of
observationally equivalent individuals. It is important to point, however, that the method that we
propose here could easily be extended to multiple metropolitan areas. In that case, even if fixed
effects were included directly in (1) for each household category upon which the instrument was
based, the instrument would have independent variation due to variation in average location
decisions made by identical household types in different metropolitan markets.23
Allowing for Endogenous Neighborhood Attributes. A final endogeneity issue arises in our
application because some of the neighborhood attributes that we would like to consider are
endogenously determined by the sorting process itself.

23

For an example, see Ross and Zenou (2005).
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Specifically, in our baseline

specifications, we include measures of the average educational attainment and percent of
households in poverty within the neighborhood in equation (1). Re-writing equation (11) and
(12) here to explicitly include neighborhood averages of certain individual attributes Z j gives:

(13)

pij = δ1W ij + δ2 X j + δ3 Z j + λ j + uij

(14)

yij = β1Z i + β 2 X j + β 3 Z j + β 4 λˆ j + ωi + ε ij

Since the sorting process generates a correlation between Zi and ξj it follows immediately that

Z j and ξj will be correlated in an analogous way in equation (13). To estimate equation (13)
therefore, we develop instruments for neighborhood demographic variables using the composition
of neighborhoods with similar fixed or exogenous attributes, such as the employment access of
the location or the physical quality of the housing stock in the neighborhood. Since neighborhood
attributes tend to be continuous variables, a distance measure is developed to characterize the
degree of similarity between neighborhoods. The instruments for each Z jm are a weighted
average of the Z km ’s for neighborhoods that are similar to neighborhood j with the weight based
on the degree of similarity or proximity (inverse of the distance in attribute space). Specifically,

(15)

)
Z j = Meank∈Π − jm ( Z kW ( X j , X k ))

where W represents a weighting function based on a non-parametric kernel smoother, such as the
tri-cubic kernel where

W ( X j , X k ) = (1 − ( D( X j , X k ) / DMax ) 3 ) 3 , D is a distance function,

and Dmax is the maximum distance over which neighborhoods will be considered, see McMillen
(1996). The instrument is exogenous to Z j given the exogeneity of Xj.24 25
24

The cubic spline requires the specification of a maximum distance at which all locations beyond that
distance have zero weight. This distance was chosen for each block group so that ten percent of all block
groups are used to calculate the average for a given block group. Results are very similar using twenty or
five percent of all block groups. Naturally, the block group itself is not included in this weighted average.
25
Again, as in the use of aggregation to form instruments for the earlier part of our estimation strategy, the
use of aggregation in a single metropolitan housing market again implies here that the independent
variation in our instrument derives from nonlinearities. It is again important to point, however, that the
method that we propose here could easily be extended to multiple metropolitan areas, where again
independent variation in the instrument would arise naturally due to across market variation. See the
Identification sub-section below for more discussion of this point.
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Having estimated equation (13), we then estimate equation (14) using the same strategy
outlined in the previous sub-section, forming instruments based on average neighborhood
attributes for households in the same cell for both exogenous and endogenous neighborhood
attributes.
Generalizing Our Simple EPS Sorting Model. A key assumption underlying the simple EPS
sorting model that we outlined in Section 3 is that individuals care about their neighborhood
choice through only two channels: the neighborhood (influenced) good y and the price of entry
into the neighborhood p. It is for this reason that a flexible function of neighborhood housing
prices makes a perfect control function for θ, the neighborhood contribution to the production of
y. To the extent that households instead value multiple dimensions of neighborhood quality, a
flexible function of neighborhood housing prices will no longer serve as a perfect control function
for θ.
So, how severe of a problem is this for our proposed methodology? The first thing to
note is that if other dimensions of neighborhood quality that affect household consumption are
observable, they can be first conditioned out of neighborhood housing prices in a first stage
hedonic price regression.26

This is the reason, for example, that we condition on housing

attributes in estimating equation (11) and separately estimate the effect of observed neighborhood
attributes on labor market outcomes. If, on the other hand, households value another dimension
of neighborhood quality that is unobserved, the control function approach that we propose will no
longer work perfectly. In that case, our proposed method will work only as well as housing
prices are indeed correlated with that aspect of neighborhood quality that affects the outcomes of
interest. In general, we hope that we are able to condition on enough of what might affect
housing prices other than neighborhood quality (e.g., housing attributes) directly in the estimation
of the first-stage hedonic price regression.
Robustness and Identification. It is important that the reader be aware of the strengths and
limitations of this identification strategy. The instruments used for neighborhood contribution in
both the labor market outcome and housing price/rent models make intuitive sense. In the
individual sample, the exposure of observationally equivalent individuals are used to instrument
for the individual’s exposure to specific neighborhood attributes, and similarly the demographic

26

If these other neighborhood attributes are exogenous, this first stage regression can be estimated via OLS.
If they are endogenous, instruments would need to be used in the first-stage regression analogous to those
discussed in the previous sub-section of the paper.

19

composition of neighborhoods with observationally similar environmental variables, primarily
housing stock composition, is used to instrument for a neighborhood’s demographic composition
in the sample of housing units. Since these instruments are based on observable characteristics of
individuals and neighborhoods, they should be orthogonal to individual and neighborhood
unobservables, respectively.
As discussed earlier, the instruments exploit the highly non-linear relationship that is
likely to arise between observable attributes and sorting outcomes. The models are identified
because some non-linear terms are excluded from the second stage labor market and housing
price regressions. We attempt to address concerns with this identification strategy in a number of
ways. First, the labor market models are expanded to include important non-linearities, i.e. the
interaction of gender with family structure. Further, we rerun the analyses dropping individuals
with high levels of human capital with the expectation that these individuals benefit less from
neighborhood level information on the labor market. Both of these changes substantially modify
the source of identification, and we would expect the results to be unstable and move in
unexpected directions in response to these changes. Similarly, we conduct additional analyses
that control for the actual neighborhood housing stock composition in the housing price and labor
market equations.

As above, we would expect spurious estimates to be quite sensitive to

including such variables, which are likely to soak up a substantially amount of information
associated with neighborhood unobservables.
We also posit that the influence of neighborhood on household capital income is likely to
be much smaller than the neighborhood effect on labor market outcomes. We regress outcomes
concerning capital income on the same set of individual and neighborhood variables using both
ordinary least squares and our instrumental variables specification. If our identification strategy
is valid, we would expect that neighborhood variables exhibit a high correlation with capital
income using OLS models due to sorting, but much smaller effects using our IV specification.
Finally, the reader should be aware of the implications of the key exogeneity assumptions
made in equation (3). The exogeneity assumption for individual variables Zi is fairly straight
forward and well understood in the literature. The impact of an individual variable like education
level is likely to capture the influence of both education and any individual unobserved attributes,
such as motivation, that are correlated with education. The exogeneity assumption for
neighborhood variables is similar for a variable that is considered fixed Xj. For example, good job
access may be correlated with some negative aspects of neighborhood quality, and therefore
capture both positive effect of job access and the ambiguous effect of the portion of unobserved
neighborhood quality that is correlated with job access in the population of neighborhoods.
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5. Sample, Control Variables, and Geography
The sample of prime age adults (age 25 to 59) are drawn from confidential Long Form
files of the 1990 Decennial Census for the Boston Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). The
sample drops a small number of non-Hispanic individuals whose race is not defined as white,
African-American, or Asian and Pacific Islander, as well as households residing in census tracts
where employment access is not defined resulting in a sample of approximately 178,000
individuals.27
The bulk of the analysis considers three variables to describe labor market outcomes:
labor force participation last week, average number of weeks worked last year conditional on
working any weeks, and average hours worked per week last year conditional on having worked
at least 40 weeks per year. Three additional labor market variables are also considered that are
likely to be behaviorally related to the preceding variables: whether the individual worked any
weeks last year, employment last week conditional on being a participant in the labor market, and
hours worked last week if employed, see Table 1. It also should be noted that the exact sample
for individual outcome variables varies because individuals are dropped from the analysis sample
when an outcome is imputed.
For the purpose of describing employment outcomes as well as identifying
observationally equivalent individuals, adults in the sample are described by series of categorical
control variables (Z) capturing the individual’s education (4), age (3), race and ethnicity (4),
household structure (6), gender (2), and immigration status (3) where the numbers in parentheses
represent the number of categories. The labor market models also contain key interactions of
gender with marital status and presence of children to address well-known aspects of female labor
force participation in the United States. These variables are also used to create categories based
on all permutations of the categorical variables giving rise to 1,718 cells. All prime age adults that
belong to the same cell ( Ω ) as the individual (excepting the individual and their family members
of course) are used to calculate average neighborhood attributes. The sample contains households
falling into 1,632 cells, and after dropping cells with less than 10 households to reduce
measurement error the final sample contains households in 996 cells. This restriction reduces the
sample by less than 3,000 individuals and has no effect on any of the empirical results presented
in the paper.
27

The sample contained approximately 700 non-Hispanic individuals who did not fit into one of these
racial categories. About 250 individuals resided in block groups where employment access is not defined.
See Bayer, Ross, and Topa (2004) for more details on the confidential census data.
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Each household and its members reside in a housing unit, and the location of that unit is
geo-coded to one of approximately 2,600 census block group in the Boston Metropolitan Area.
The neighborhood is described by the following block group characteristics:

percent of

households in poverty, percent of individuals who are college graduates, percent individuals who
are disadvantage minorities (African-American or Hispanic), and percent of individuals who were
not born in the U.S.; as well as a job access measure calculated at the census tract level. The job
access measure is based on an average of jobs in the same age and education category as the
individual where the average is weighted based on the average commute time between the
individual’s residence and potential employment locations.

The weights are based on the

coefficient estimates arising from a gravity model, see O’Reagan and Quigley (1998).28
A proxy for unobserved neighborhood attributes is calculated as the block group mean
residual from a housing price hedonic regression. These residuals are obtained by regressing the
logarithm of house price and/or rent (depending upon whether owner-occupied or not) on the
physical attributes of each unit: number of bedrooms, number of rooms, age of the unit, whether
the unit is single family, whether a multi-family with 10 to 19 units, and whether multi-family
with 20 or more units, as well as the neighborhood composition variables described above.29 As
discussed earlier, the neighborhood composition arises from a household sorting process and is
endogenous to location unobservables. Therefore, the housing price/rent equation is estimated
using instrumental variables, and the instruments are constructed as weighted averages of the
demographic composition of similar neighborhoods based on the following neighborhood
housing stock variables: percent owner-occupied units, percent single family units, percent large
multi-family units (greater than 20 units), percent 1 bedroom or studio units, percent 4 plus
bedroom units, average age of housing stock, presence of group quarters, as well as employment
access are used as instruments.

28

The gravity model is estimated by regressing the logarithm of the number of workers commuting
between two locations on the logarithms of the workers at the origination, of the jobs at the destination, and
of the commute time between those locations. Typically, location combinations are dropped when no flows
are observed between two locations, which can lead to a noisy measure of employment access at the census
tract level. In order to mitigate this noise, we use the logarithm of one plus the flows and impute commute
times using a non-parametric kernal smoother based on the cubic spline.
29
The model allows hedonic attributes to vary by owner-occupancy, and the logarithmic transformation
allows the difference between monthly flows (rent) and value (house value) to be captured by the owneroccupancy dummy. A common dummy variable is estimated for each neighborhood using all housing units
in that neighborhood whether rental or owner-occupied.
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6. Empirical Results
Baseline Models
Prior to discussing and interpreting the empirical results, it is important to acknowledge
that a relationship between labor market outcomes and neighborhood attributes may exist for a
variety of reasons. The most commonly discussed mechanism involves information barriers to
job search and the significance of informal job market referrals. Residential locations that are far
from employment concentrations or have high concentrations of individuals who are not strongly
attached to the labor market may provide job searchers with little opportunities for mentoring or
for gathering information concerning potential job openings. In policy discussions, the usual
presumption is that these factors are much more important for youth and low skill workers. On
the other hand, a high quality neighborhood may provide the individual with neighborhood
amenities that are complementary to leisure or may expose individuals to lower risk of adverse
events that influence labor market productivity or behavior. For example, Kling, Liebman, Katz,
and Sanbonmatsu (2004) find that public housing residents who were randomly selected to
receive vouchers to move to low poverty rate neighborhoods had improved health outcomes.
These last two factors may affect all workers equally or may even have a larger effect on high
human capital workers with substantial experience or education.
Table 2 presents the results for the OLS and IV estimations of the relationship between
individual and neighborhood attributes and being in the labor market, weeks worked last year if
working last year, and average hours worked per week if worked at least 40 weeks last year,
respectively.30 The specifications presented control for individual attributes plus employment
access, poverty rate, and percent of residents who graduated with a college degree from a fouryear institution. The IV specification also includes a control for neighborhood unobservables
based on housing prices and rents in each block group.
Focusing on the estimates for neighborhood variables, the estimated impact of
neighborhood attributes are substantially larger than the OLS estimates. Specifically, the positive
impact of employment access increases dramatically for all three employment outcomes so that a
one standard deviation in employment access implies a two percent increase in the likelihood of
labor force participation, a one and a third of a week increase in number of weeks worked in a
year, and a two and a half hour increase in hours worked per week. The negative impact of a one
standard deviation increase in the poverty rate is a seven percent lower labor force participation
30

The estimates for individual attributes also appear reasonable. Focusing on labor force participation,
males have higher participation rates, participation falls between 45 and 59, participation rises with
education, increases for married males especially with kids, and decreases for married females especially
with young children.
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rate and one week less work during the year with the impact on hours being positive and
statistically insignificant. The neighborhood unobservables are also associated with more labor
force participation, weeks, and hours.
The percent college educated is negatively associated with all three outcomes. This
finding is consistent with previous findings that labor market referrals are used less intensively by
individuals with higher levels of education (Ionnides and Loury, 2004) and that college educated
individuals may both benefit less from and contribute less to informal job networks (Bayer, Ross,
and Topa, 2004). Alternatively, percent college educated may capture local amenities that are
complementary to leisure and non-market home production activities. For example, individuals
residing in locations with neighbors who have a higher level of education may simply enjoy
working less and spending more time at home. As discussed, this explanation might help explain
why Moving to Opportunity finds a positive impact of neighborhood on health, but no impact of
neighborhood on labor market outcomes. Presumably, the lower poverty rates lead to superior
health outcomes and an associated increase in labor market potential, but the exposure to more
college educated individuals decreases labor market outcomes.
The finding that OLS estimates of neighborhood effects are biased downwards is
consistent with the hypothesis that individuals with poor unobservables in terms of labor market
outcomes compensate for these unobservables by sorting into locations with better employment
prospects. In the neighborhood effects literature, researchers have often expected to find positive
selection where high quality workers reside in high quality locations. While this view makes
considerable sense when considering the demand for neighborhood amenities related to quality of
life, it is less clear that positive selection will arise on variables that impact labor market
participation, such as employment access or the quality of informal job networks. High skill
workers with strong attachment to the labor market may be less willing than workers with weak
labor market attachment to give up neighborhood quality of life amenities in exchange for access
to urban environments with good labor market information and low job search costs.
Table 3 presents the results for alternative education subsamples with the first panel
presenting the full sample results and the next two panels containing subsamples after dropping
individuals with four-year college degrees or dropping individuals with two or more years of
college, respectively. The effect of employment access and poverty on labor force participation
increases in magnitude as high human capital individuals are eliminated from the sample. This
pattern should be expected if the influence of employment access and poverty on labor force
participation is driven primarily by neighborhood contributions to job networks. Similarly, the
effect of poverty on weeks worked increases in magnitude, and the effect of poverty on hours
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becomes negative but is still insignificant.31

On the other hand, the negative effect of

employment access on weeks per year and hours per week worked is quite stable as college
educated workers are dropped from the sample. This result is not very surprising. The models
are estimated for people who are already in the labor market so that the influence of job access is
likely to represent costs associated with commuting to an existing job. Commuting costs are
often primarily time costs, which actually rise with human capital levels.32 Table 4 presents a
similar exercise dropping white collar workers and shows that the importance of employment
access for labor force participation is larger for non-white collar workers.
The negative effect of percent college educated on labor force participation falls for
lower skill populations. This effect might be expected to increase in magnitude if this relationship
was driven by the availability of job market referrals since non-college graduates would appear to
be least likely to benefit from referrals provided by college graduates. The decline in the
variable’s effect for populations with lower human capital may reflect a lower demand for these
neighborhood amenities among low human capital individuals and therefore less substitution
towards leisure among non-college educated. Again, Table 4 mirrors the results for education
with non-white collar workers experiencing a smaller negative relationship between the presence
of college graduates in a neighborhood and labor force participation.
Table 5 presents estimates for subsamples based on gender and family structure. The
table focuses on a series of subsamples that are designed to represent increased attachment to the
labor market by first dropping married females with children from the sample, then dropping all
married females, and finally dropping all females from the sample and focusing only on primeage males. The results are quite striking. All estimates for the four neighborhood variables
decline in magnitude and many become statistically insignificant suggesting that women and
especially married women are driving our findings. As in Tables 3 and 4, this table further
supports the idea that neighborhoods matter most for the labor market activity of individuals who
are not strongly attached to the labor market.
Decomposing the Effects of the Identification Strategy
Table 6 presents the estimates on the neighborhood variables for a series of
specifications. The first column presents the results from OLS, and the second column presents
31

This suggests a larger positive effect of poverty on hours for the college educated. This finding may
represent a neighborhood amenities story with high education individuals disliking spending time at home
when they reside in high poverty rate neighborhoods and responding to this dislike by working more hours.
32
See Ross and Zenou (2004) for a study that examines the relationship between commute time and labor
market outcomes.
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the results from a second stage estimation where the neighborhood fixed effects from labor
market models are regressed upon neighborhood variables. The third column contains estimates
for a simple instrumental variable model where the three neighborhood variables are predicted
using the expected exposure level based on observationally equivalent individuals. The final
three columns add a housing price residual from a simple housing price hedonic using ordinary
least squares, instrument for that residual based on observationally equivalent individuals, and
finally instrument for a unbiased residual arising from using IV in the housing price/rent model.
The main conclusion arising from this table is that the increase in the importance of
neighborhood variables arises from instrumenting for those variables in order to break the link
between those neighborhood variables and the individual unobservable. The two stage fixed
effect estimates look nothing like the results from the IV specification, and the IV specifications
are broadly similar in terms of the effect of observed neighborhood attributes. In addition, the
housing price residual does not matter until an instrument is used to break the correlation between
those neighborhood unobservables and individual unobservables.

The overall effect of

neighborhood appears to be smaller in the final IV specification as compared the intermediate IV
specifications suggesting that the effect of neighborhood may in some cases be overstated when
the model does not correctly control for sorting over location specific unobservables.
As discussed earlier, these findings are consistent with a compensation strategy where
individuals with lower likelihoods of employment seek out neighborhoods that provide the best
opportunity for employment. Of course, the negative correlation between individual labor market
unobservables and neighborhood contribution to labor market outcomes may be driven by tastes
over neighborhood attributes. For example, individuals with poor labor market unobservables
may also exhibit the weakest preference for positive amenities associated with neighborhoods that
have poor job access or attract a large number of college graduates based on their housing stock,
and as a result these individuals reside in neighborhoods that provide better job market
opportunities. On the other hand, the influence of location unobservables appears to arise from
positive selection where individuals with high taste observables reside in neighborhoods with
positive neighborhood unobservables in terms of labor market outcomes.
Exploring Neighborhood Determinants
Table 7 presents a series of specifications starting with no neighborhood controls except
for the housing market residual and then expanding the list of controls to add poverty,
employment access, percent with a four-year college education, percent disadvantaged minorities,
and finally percent not born in the United States in sequence. A unique set of neighborhood
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housing price residuals is constructed for each specification where the residual is conditional on
the same set of neighborhood controls that were included in the labor market equation. For
example, in the no neighborhood control specification, the housing price regression contains no
neighborhood controls, and the housing price residual captures the net impact of all aspects of
neighborhood quality that are reflected in housing prices.
The key finding of a large negative impact of poverty on labor force participation and
weeks worked is quite robust across specifications. The estimated coefficients are similar in
magnitude whether or not the specification includes employment access and percent college
educated and the magnitude increases with the inclusion of the share minority and immigrant
because those neighborhood variables, especially share immigrant, appear to be associated with
higher levels of work on all three measures. Neighborhoods with a high share of immigrants may
provide especially fertile ground for job referrals and other aspects of the informal job search
process. The positive impact of employment access on weeks worked and hours appears robust,
but the magnitude falls off as the share minority and immigrant variables are included, and
employment access appears to have no impact on labor force participation after including the
minority and immigration composition variables.33 The negative relationship between percent
college educated and labor market outcomes is very stable for all three outcome variables.
The estimated coefficient on neighborhood quality is smaller in magnitude for all three
labor market outcomes and negative for weeks and hours worked in the model that does not
contain any other neighborhood variables. In this model, the neighborhood quality variable
captures the net effect of neighborhood given the correlation between different factors that arise
in equilibrium, and this net affect appears to be smaller than the individual effects of
neighborhood attributes and ambiguous in sign. In equilibrium, the share of college graduates is
negatively with poverty rates, and yet both variables reduce the rate and intensity of labor force
participation. In practice, they likely cancel out leading to little net influence of neighborhood
quality (as captured by price) on labor market outcomes. Once the college degree variable is
included, the sign on the housing price residual is consistently positive and the estimated
magnitudes are quite stable. Whether the variable captures the low referral contribution of college
graduates or consumption amenities that increase the demand for leisure, the inclusion of this
variable separates two sets of neighborhood unobservables that are both positively correlated with
33

The fact that the employment access estimates may not be robust to the inclusion of additional
neighborhood variables should not be surprising. Remember, unlike the neighborhood demographic
composition variables, job access is assumed exogenous to neighborhood unobservables, which will lead
bias due to omitted minority and immigration variables if job access is correlated with omitted
neighborhood variables that attract those populations.
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price based measures of neighborhood quality, but have conflicting impacts on labor market
outcomes.
Additional Validation and Robustness Efforts
Table 8 presents estimates of the relationship between capital income and neighborhood
variables in order to see whether our identification strategy implies unrealistically large impacts
of neighborhood attributes on capital income. Such findings would suggest that our identification
strategy is flawed. Capital income is very noisy and attempts to estimate linear models of capital
income did not provide credible estimates on individual attributes. For example, these analyses
found no statistically significant relationship between age or education and capital income. In
order to mitigate the effect of noise in the self-reported capital income, we focus on three binary
variables, which were defined as zero if the individual had between zero capital income and some
positive threshold, one if they had capital income above that threshold, and missing if capital
income is not reported, imputed or negative. The three thresholds used are $0, $1,000, and
$3,000.
Employment access, percent college educated, and in some cases poverty are all
correlated with capital income as indicated by the simple OLS regressions. The estimates on
neighborhood variables from the instrumental variable specifications are always statistically
insignificant and almost always smaller that the estimates arising from OLS. The one exception
is the coefficient on poverty in the model for whether capital income is above $3,000. Even for
this estimate, the magnitude of the effect is quite small with a one standard deviation in poverty
leading to a less than one percent change in likelihood of having capital income above $3,000.34
Table 9 presents the results for three alternative indicators of labor market outcomes:
whether worked any weeks last year, whether employed last week, and number of hours worked
last week if employed. These variables parallel the three dependent variables used for most of the
analysis with worked last year capturing behaviors related to labor force participation, employed
last week capturing the risk of unemployment that might reduce the number of week worked in
any year, and hours last week capturing behaviors similar to those captured by average hours
worked per week last year. The first panel contains the results for the original three outcome
variables and the second contains the results for these three alternative variables. The estimated
effects of neighborhood attributes based on the original variables and based on the alternative

34

A reader might question whether the increasingly positive coefficient on poverty in the IV specification
might represent a trend and become large and significant for higher thresholds. We examined models with
higher capital income thresholds and did not find any such trend.
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dependent variables are quite similar.35
Table 10 incorporates a control for the quality of the housing stock in a neighborhood,
which is an aggregation of the same housing stock variables used to instrument for neighborhood
composition variables. The original IV specification and the specification that includes this
control for housing stock are shown side by side.

A quick comparison confirms that the

magnitudes of all estimated coefficients are quite stable to the inclusion of a housing stock
control into both the labor market and housing price/rent models. The reader should note that the
model includes the actual housing stock rather than an instrument based on the exposure of
observationally equivalent households. The inclusion of the housing stock control is intended to
assure that the housing price residual is identified by unexplained variation in housing prices
rather than a housing stock exclusion restriction, and the large and significant coefficient estimate
on housing stock represent sorting bias rather than any direct effect of neighborhood housing
stock on labor market outcomes.36
7. Summary and Conclusions
In this paper, we consider the general problem of identifying the effect of individual and
group attributes on individual outcomes in a model that allows for both individual and group
unobservables. We begin by using a simple version of the canonical vertical model of sorting
developed in Epple and Platt (1998) and Epple and Sieg (1999) (EPS) to highlight the complex
set of correlations that even a simple model of residential sorting induces between all individual
and group attributes. We then offer a non-parametric solution to this identification problem that
is grounded in the structure of the sorting equilibrium in the EPS model. In particular, we exploit
the monotonic relationship between neighborhood housing prices and neighborhood quality in
equilibrium to show that a flexible function of neighborhood housing prices serves as a suitable
control function for the neighborhood unobservable in the labor market outcome regression. By
including this control function, we eliminate the group unobservable from the regression, thereby
reducing the problem to a more standard selection problem with a single individual-level
unobservable.
To address this more standard selection problem, we use aggregation to develop suitable
instruments for both exogenous and endogenous group attributes. Instrumenting for each
35

The participation and hours variables are directly comparable to each other in magnitude. The estimates
in the employment and weeks worked equations are not, but one can verify that the relative magnitudes of
the coefficient estimates from the two models are quite close.
36
Results are also robust to a model that instruments for housing stock, and in that model housing stock is
not statistically significant.
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individual’s observed neighborhood attributes with the average neighborhood attributes of a set of
observationally identical individuals eliminates the portion of the variation in neighborhood
attributes due to sorting on unobserved individual attributes.
To illustrate our proposed methodology, we estimate a wide variety of labor market
models using confidential data on the Boston Metropolitan Area from the 1990 census long form.
We find that neighborhood has large and complex affects on labor market outcomes.
Employment access, low levels of poverty, a low fraction of college graduates, and high levels of
unobserved neighborhood attributes are all associated with higher levels of labor force
participation, greater number of weeks worked in a year, and with the exception of poverty
greater average number of hours worked per week. The estimated effects of neighborhood
variables are economically meaningful with for example a one standard deviation increase in
employment access leading to approximately a four percentage point increase in labor force
participation in the subsample of individuals who have never attended college. Moreover, the
estimated effects are substantially larger than estimates arising from ordinary least squares
suggesting that individuals with a lower likelihood of obtaining employment have sorted into
locations with superior labor market opportunities potentially to compensate for their poor
unobservables. It is notable that the core results in the paper are robust across many outcomes
variables and a wide variety of specifications.
As expected, the positive impact of low neighborhood poverty rates and good job access
on labor force participation increases as high human capital individuals or white collar workers
are deleted from the sample. The existing literature suggests that these individuals are least likely
to benefit from informal labor market referral networks. On the other hand, the positive impact of
good job access on the intensity of labor force participation as captured by weeks per year and
hours per week does not change as the human capital level of the sample falls. This finding may
in part be due to the fact that high human capital individuals have a high cost of time and
therefore may substitute away from work as commutes increase. The effects over gender are
even more striking all findings decline in magnitude and many become statistically insignificant
as married women and eventually all women are deleted from the sample. Overall, the results
indicate that neighborhood effects are most important for individuals with weak attachment to the
labor market, especially married women.
While the effect of individual variables appears large, the net effect of neighborhood
quality is actually quite small. This finding appears to be driven by the strong negative effect of
the percent of college graduates in a neighborhood on labor market outcomes. Neighborhoods
with low poverty rates and other attributes that positively impact labor market outcomes appear
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correlated with the percent of college graduates in equilibrium. These competing effects lead to
small and sometimes negative relationships between overall neighborhood quality and various
labor market outcomes, which is consistent with findings in the Moving to Opportunity program
that improvements in neighborhoods quality had little or no impact on earnings. Moreover, these
findings help explain a puzzle in the MTO results. Voucher recipients in MTO experience
improved health outcomes, but do not experience the improvement in labor market outcomes
often associated with improvements in physical and mental health. The positive effects of
improved health on labor market potential may have been counteracted by other influences of
neighborhood that lead to reduced labor supply.
These findings suggest that a richer understanding of the relationship between
neighborhood and economic self-sufficiency is required to address the high unemployment rates
and low incomes occurring in poor, central city neighborhoods. High poverty rate neighborhoods
appear to have a large negative affect on labor market outcomes, especially for low human capital
populations. This large effect might be attributable in part to the negative impacts of high
poverty locations on health and emotional well being found in the Moving to Opportunity
program. Future mobility programs should take into account the possibility that small net effects
of neighborhood quality hide large positive and negative impacts on labor market outcomes. For
example, the potential negative impact of moving on informal referral networks may in part be
offset by increased provision of formal job search support.
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Variable Names
Labor-Force
Participant
Weeks-Worked
Last-Year
Weekly-Hours
Last-Year
Worked-Last
Year
Employed-Last
Week
Hours-Worked
Last-Week
Positive-Capital
Income
Capital-Income
>1000
Capital-Income
>3000

Table 1: Variable Names, Description, Means, and Standard Errors
Variable Description
Respondent Outcome Variables
One if respondent was working or looking for work at the time of the Census Survey
Total number of weeks worked last year; missing if no weeks worked last year
Average number of hours worked per week last year; missing if worked less than 40 weeks
last year
One if respondent worked any weeks last year
One if respondent was employed last week, zero if unemployed and a labor force participant,
and missing otherwise
Number of hours worked last week; missing if not employed last week

Male

One if respondent has positive capital income; missing if capital income negative, imputed or
not reported
One if respondent has positive capital income; missing if capital income negative, imputed or
not reported
One if respondent has positive capital income; missing if capital income negative, imputed or
not reported
Categorical Respondent Control Variables
One if respondent male (omitted category female)

Age35-44

One if respondent between 35 and 44 years of age (omitted category 25 to 34 years)

Age45-59

One if respondent between 45 and 59 years of age

Black

One if respondent non-Hispanic Black (omitted category non-Hispanic white)

Hispanic

One if respondent Hispanic

Asian

One if respondent Asian or Pacific Islander

No-High-School

One if respondent did not graduate from high school (omitted category high school graduate)

Some-college

One if respondent finished at least two years of college but does not have four year degree

College

One if respondent gradudated with a four year college degree

SingleIndependent
Single-parent

One if respondent is single and not living with family members (omitted category married
not residing with any of their own children who are under the age of 18 – minors)
One if respondent is a single parent residing with their minor child

Single-withfamily
Married-with17yr-kid
Married-with-05yr-kid
Married-Female

One if respondent is single and living with family members other than their children

Married-Femalekids
Married-Female0-5-kids
Non-US-born

Interaction between marital status, respondent female, and residing with own minor children

Non-US-Citizen

One if respondent is not a U.S. citizen

One if respondent is married and residing with their minor children
One if respondent married residing with their own child under the age of six (omitted
category married residing with their own children, but no child under the age of six)
Interaction between marital status and respondent female

Interaction between marital status, respondent female, and residing with own child who is
under the age of six
One if respondent is U.S. citizen not born in the U.S. (omitted category born in the U.S.)
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Means and
Standard Error
0.854
(0.352)
40.105
19.228)
34.388
(17.635)
0.856
(0.350)
0.811
(0.390)
32.551
19.750)
0.453
(0.498)
0.307
(0.461)
0.268
(0.443)
0.482
(0.499)
0.317
(0.465)
0.302
(0.459)
0.047
(0.210)
0.033
(0.178)
0.029
(0.167)
0.099
(0.298)
0.247
(0.431)
0.404
(0.490)
0.224
(0.417)
0.094
(0.291)
0.051
(0.219)
0.179
(0.383)
0.187
(0.390)
0.321
(0.467)
0.184
(0.387)
0.093
(0.291)
0.065
(0.247)
0.072
(0.259)

Variable Names

Table 1: Variable Names, Description, Means, and Standard Errors (Continued)
Variable Description

EmploymentAccess
Percent-Poverty

Neighborhood Level Variables
Employment access index based on gravity model using non-parametrically smoothed
estimates of commuting time between census tracts
Percent of households in poverty within a census block group

Percent-College
Graduate
Housing-Price
Residual
Percent-Minority
Disadvantage
Percent-NotBorn
US
Housing-Stock
Index

Percent of prime age individuals (age 25-59) with a four year college degree within a census
block group
Block group mean of the housing price residual arising from a metropolitan wide housing
price hedonic that controls for the three block group attributes listed above
Percent of households in census block group headed by either an African-American or
Hispanic respondent
Percent of prime age individuals in census block group who were not born in the United
States
Block group mean of a housing stock index based on mean housing stock attributes of each
block group using the coefficient estimates on those mean attributes in a housing price
hedonic
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Means and
Standard Error
1.051
(0.067)
0.051
(0.065)
0.401
(0.210)
0.005
(0.067)
0.084
(0.177)
0.069
(0.061)
0.215
(0.167)

Variables
Male
Age35-44
Age45-59
Black
Hispanic
Asian
No-High-School
Some-college
College
SingleIndependent
Single-parent
Single-withfamily
Married-with17yr-kid
Married-with-05yr-kid
Married-Female
Married-Femalekids
Married-Female0-5-kids
Non-US-born
Non-US-Citizen
EmploymentAccess
Percent-Poverty
Percent-College
Graduate
Housing-Price
Residual

Table 2: Models of Labor Models Outcomes
Labor Force Participant
Weeks Worked Last Year
OLS
Final IV Model
OLS
Final IV Model
-0.573
0.022
0.018
-0.549
(-5.39)
(-5.43)
(8.12)
(6.60)
1.014
0.001
0.009
0.721
(8.77)
(10.95)
(0.36)
(3.59)
1.096
-0.053
-0.040
0.571
(6.51)
(9.06)
(-22.05)
(-11.77)
-0.018
0.031
0.098
0.352
(1.94)
(-0.06)
(5.90)
(10.70)
-0.670
-0.010
0.034
-0.365
(-1.48)
(-2.12)
(-1.43)
(3.74)
-0.093
-0.041
-0.028
-0.042
(-0.17)
(-0.35)
(-4.55)
(-3.05)
-1.535
-0.087
-0.076
-1.271
(-8.52)
(-9.02)
(-20.44)
(-16.14)
1.023
0.052
0.054
0.580
(6.58)
(9.06)
(20.69)
(17.43)
1.989
0.082
0.097
0.672
(7.90)
(8.12)
(33.70)
(14.28)
-1.516
-0.035
-0.039
-1.253
(-11.43)
(-9.20)
(-12.34)
(-8.74)
-2.565
-0.060
-0.049
-2.563
(-17.26)
(-14.50)
(-16.56)
(-11.10)
-3.446
-0.148
-0.126
-3.443
(-17.66)
(-16.63)
(-25.83)
(-20.97)
0.788
0.015
0.023
0.581
(6.14)
(7.49)
(6.34)
(8.09)
0.945
-0.003
0.006
0.771
(7.89)
(8.89)
(-1.15)
(2.36)
-2.543
-0.117
-0.118
-2.650
(-17.99)
(-17.01
(-27.77)
(-27.69)
-3.518
-0.059
-0.059
-3.565
(-20.65)
(-20.34)
(-12.20)
(-12.10)
-3.167
-0.162
-0.162
-3.108
(-14.49)
(-14.72)
(-29.24)
(-29.11)
0.40
0.017
0.013
0.513
(3.63)
(2.53)
(4.12)
(2.90)
-2.082
-0.020
-0.034
-1.857
(-10.66)
(-10.15)
(-3.91)
(-6.00)
19.156
0.006
0.308
1.769
(2.83)
(3.41)
(0.32)
(2.02)
-14.709
-0.528
-1.055
-11.176
(-15.03)
(-3.18)
(-20.62)
(-8.29)
-13.929
-0.099
-0.434
-2.397
(-12.26)
(-8.62)
(-15.01
(-9.71)
0.514
7.270
(3.76)
(9.48)
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Weekly Hours Last Year
OLS
Final IV Model
2.664
2.626
(28.21)
(27.10)
-0.534
0.050
(-6.81)
(0.58)
-1.569
-0.578
(-19.03)
(-5.63)
0.707
-1.266
(4.45)
(-4.68)
0.151
-1.423
(0.65)
(-4.83)
0.611
-0.074
(2.31)
(-0.28)
0.010
-0.799
(0.08)
(-5.85)
0.411
1.262
(5.04)
(12.31)
1.874
4.025
(23.01
(17.89)
-1.627
-2.611
(-13.96)
(-16.49)
-3.595
-3.751
(-28.23)
(-25.58)
-4.082
-4.517
(-22.54)
(-23.50)
1.068
1.564
(9.70)
(13.18)
1.072
1.465
(9.57)
(12.17)
-4.506
-4.363
(-30.99)
(-29.47)
-6.551
-6.485
(-36.33)
(-3.00)
-2.604
-2.696
(-12.25)
(-12.68)
0.971
0.583
(6.83)
(3.77)
0.309
-0.472
(1.95)
(-2.59)
-1.501
36.068
(-2.68)
(7.42)
-3.550
6.027
(-5.14)
(1.52)
1.264
-17.186
(6.11)
(-11.93)
11.685
(7.33)

EmploymentAccess
Percent-Poverty
Percent-College
Graduate
Housing-Price
Residual
EmploymentAccess
Percent-Poverty
Percent-College
Graduate
Housing-Price
Residual
EmploymentAccess
Percent-Poverty
Percent-College
Graduate
Housing-Price
Residual

EmploymentAccess
Percent-Poverty
Percent-College
Graduate
Housing-Price
Residual
EmploymentAccess
Percent-Poverty
Percent-College
Graduate
Housing-Price
Residual

Table 3: Labor Market Models for Subsample with Lower Education Levels
Labor Force Participant
Weeks Worked Last Year
Weekly Hours Last Year
OLS
Final IV Model
OLS
Final IV Model
OLS
Final IV Model
Full Sample
19.156
-1.501
36.068
0.006
0.308
1.769
(2.83)
(3.41)
(-2.68)
(7.42)
(0.32)
(2.02)
-14.709
-3.550
6.027
-0.528
-1.055
-11.176
(-15.03)
(-3.18)
(-5.14)
(1.52)
(-20.62)
(-8.29)
-13.929
1.264
-17.186
-0.099
-0.434
-2.397
(-12.26)
(-8.62)
(6.11)
(-11.93)
(-15.01
(-9.71)
11.685
0.514
7.270
(3.76)
(7.33)
(9.48)
Sample After Dropping All Respondents with Degrees from Four Year Colleges
0.424
2.616
17.239
-3.901
44.459
-0.004
(-0.19)
(2.08)
(3.82)
(2.37)
(-6.00)
(7.42)
-1.203
-10.010
-11.284
-3.020
-0.160
-0.578
(-19.75)
(-7.66)
(-11.52)
(-2.01
(-4.01
(-0.03)
-0.225
-1.671
-14.480
-0.403
-16.394
-0.092
(-10.37)
(-2.94)
(-6.26)
(-5.39)
(-1.56)
(-7.39)
11.163
11.468
0.522
(7.78)
(4.58)
(5.90)
Sample After Dropping All Respondents with Two or More Years of College
0.704
3.457
14.367
-4.701
32.041
-0.044
(-1.59)
(2.28)
(3.82)
(1.30)
(-5.95)
(3.59)
-1.533
-9.034
-20.073
-2.104
-7.825
-0.604
(-17.59)
(-7.00)
(-7.97)
(-2.53)
(-2.41)
(-1.19)
-0.188
-0.635
-16.547
0.156
-8.290
-0.063
(-4.96)
(-1.38)
(-1.65)
(-3.47)
(0.44)
(-2.10)
12.046
7.121
0.480
(5.57)
(3.74)
(2.88)

Table 4: Labor Market Models for Non-White Collar Subsample
Labor Force Participant
Weeks Worked Last Year
OLS
Final IV Model
OLS
Final IV Model
Full Sample
19.156
0.006
0.308
1.769
(2.83)
(3.41)
(0.32)
(2.02)
-14.709
-0.528
-1.055
-11.176
(-15.03)
(-3.18)
(-20.62)
(-8.29)
-13.929
-0.099
-0.434
-2.397
(-12.26)
(-8.62)
(-15.01
(-9.71)
0.514
7.270
(3.76)
(9.48)
Sample After Dropping All White Collar Employees
0.033
0.599
1.833
19.695
(2.01
(3.92)
(2.59)
(2.85)
-0.304
-0.715
-11.077
-11.635
(-14.16)
(-5.71)
(-12.42)
(-2.07)
-0.061
-0.225
-2.349
-13.342
(-9.22)
(-4.41)
(-9.04)
(-6.12)
0.288
10.563
(5.56)
(4.56)
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Weekly Hours Last Year
OLS
Final IV Model
-1.501
(-2.68)
-3.550
(-5.14)
1.264
(6.11)

36.068
(7.42)
6.027
(1.52)
-17.186
(-11.93)
11.685
(7.33)

-3.140
(-4.76)
-3.592
(-4.58)
-0.108
(-0.43)

40.048
(7.05)
4.826
(1.05)
-15.812
(-8.57)
10.586
(5.79)

EmploymentAccess
Percent-Poverty
Percent-College
Graduate
Housing-Price
Residual
EmploymentAccess
Percent-Poverty
Percent-College
Graduate
Housing-Price
Residual
EmploymentAccess
Percent-Poverty
Percent-College
Graduate
Housing-Price
Residual
EmploymentAccess
Percent-Poverty
Percent-College
Graduate
Housing-Price
Residual

Table 5: Labor Market Models with Gender and Family Structure Subamples
Labor Force Participant
Weeks Worked Last Year
Weekly Hours Last Year
OLS
Final IV Model
OLS
Final IV Model
OLS
Final IV Model
Full Sample
19.156
-1.501
36.068
0.006
0.308
1.769
(2.83)
(3.41)
(-2.68)
(7.42)
(0.32)
(2.02)
-14.709
-3.550
6.027
-0.528
-1.055
-11.176
(-15.03)
(-3.18)
(-5.14)
(1.52)
(-20.62)
(-8.29)
-13.929
1.264
-17.186
-0.099
-0.434
-2.397
(-12.26)
(-8.62)
(6.11)
(-11.93)
(-15.01
(-9.71)
11.685
0.514
7.270
(3.76)
(7.33)
(9.48)
Sample After Dropping All Married Women with Children
-0.023
0.300
0.560
10.518
-2.464
14.477
(-1.23)
(1.88)
(0.83)
(1.82)
(-4.36)
(2.82)
-0.548
-1.283
-11.728
-19.112
-4.700
3.751
(-21.49)
(-9.60)
(-14.178)
(-3.97)
(-6.48)
(0.89)
-0.075
-0.582
-2.180
-14.357
1.747
-13.214
(-11.61)
(-12.45)
(-10.72)
(-8.49)
(8.29)
(-8.66)
0.468
4.176
4.029
(8.39)
(2.12)
(2.43)
Sample After Dropping All Married Women
-0.029
0.180
0.155
0.363
-3.068
-4.176
(-0.38)
(1.09)
(0.21)
(0.06)
(-5.00)
(-0.78)
-0.577
-1.349
-12.153
-10.489
-5.263
17.288
(-21.93)
(9.64)
(-14.90)
(-2.07)
(-6.72)
(3.94)
-0.049
-0.273
-1.853
-5.916
2.287
1.394
(-7.65)
(5.63)
(-8.80)
(-3.28)
(9.95)
(0.84)
0.473
4.699
4.680
(7.98)
(2.27)
(2.71)
Sample After Dropping All Women
-0.053
-0.218
-0.812
-4.658
-4.036
-11.178
(-2.83)
(-1.26)
(-1.12)
(-0.68)
(-5.82)
(-1.68)
-0.429
-0.290
-12.042
-5.867
-4.966
20.916
(-14.21)
(-2.01
(-12.45)
(-1.01
(-4.84)
(3.94)
-0.037
-0.017
-1.257
-7.434
3.131
2.438
(-5.17)
(-0.33)
(-5.35)
(-3.57)
(11.43)
(1.20)
0.073
2.534
-0.779
(1.01
(0.94)
(-0.33)
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Models

EmploymentAccess
Percent-Poverty
Percent-College
Graduate
Housing-Price
Residual
EmploymentAccess
Percent-Poverty
Percent-College
Graduate
Housing-Price
Residual
EmploymentAccess
Percent-Poverty
Percent-College
Graduate
Housing-Price
Residual

OLS

0.006
(0.32)
-0.528
(-20.62)
-0.099
(-15.01

-1.501
(-2.68)
-3.550
(-5.14)
1.264
(6.11)

1.769
(2.83)
-11.176
(-15.03)
-2.397
(-12.26)

Table 6: Incremental Modification of Specification
Fixed Effects
IV
IV with
Second Stage
Neighborhood
Housing Price
Controls
Residual
Labor Force Participant
0.027
0.620
0.601
(1.28)
(4.18)
(4.05)
-0.523
-1.674
-1.665
(-30.66)
(-13.65)
(-13.52)
-0.091
-0.251
-0.221
(-14.02)
(-6.30)
(-5.57)
-0.062
(-9.07)
Weeks Worked Last Year
1.011
43.157
43.568
(0.84)
(9.01
(9.10)
-42.043
-6.902
-7.159
(-43.32)
(-1.99)
(-2.06)
1.251
-12.892
-13.490
(3.40)
(-9.60)
(-10.08)
1.301
(7.03)
Weekly Hours Last Year
-1.925
23.570
23.066
(-1.84)
(4.29)
(4.20)
-32.24
-22.723
-22.413
(-37.98)
(-5.36)
(-5.28)
4.073
-11.251
-10.521
(12.64)
(-7.83)
(-7.31)
-1.601
(-8.70)
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IV for Housing
Price Residual

Final IV Model

1.461
(8.93)
-2.250
(-16.82)
-0.866
(-12.36)
0.696
(11.68)

0.308
(2.02)
-1.055
(-8.29)
-0.434
(-9.71)
0.514
(9.48)

52.121
(9.72)
-13.454
(-3.53)
-19.426
(-9.02)
7.243
(3.86)

36.068
(7.42)
6.027
(1.52)
-17.186
(-11.93)
11.685
(7.33)

31.185
(5.10)
-28.302
(-5.90)
-16.80
(-6.69)
6.147
(2.87)

19.156
(3.41)
-14.709
(-3.18)
-13.929
(-8.62)
7.270
(3.76)

Models

EmploymentAccess
Percent-Poverty
Percent-College
Graduate
PercentMinority
Disadvantage
Percent-NotBorn
US
Housing-Price
Residual

Table 7: Final IV Model for Alternative Sets of Neighborhood Controls
No
Poverty Only
Poverty and
Plus Percent
Plus Percent
Neighborhood
Employment
College
Minority
Controls
Access
Graduate
Disadvantaged
Labor Force Participant
-0.166
0.308
0.226
(-1.11)
(2.02)
(1.47)
-1.226
-0.905
-1.055
-1.435
(-11.81)
(-7.11)
(-8.29)
(-9.27)
-0.434
-0.435
(-9.71)
(-9.68)
0.186
(4.43)

0.308
(9.90)

0.106
(3.45)

0.259
(6.24)
Weeks Worked Last Year
3.779
(0.71)
-11.556
-9.154
(-3.31)
(-2.00)

0.514
(9.48)

0.586
(10.59)

0.526
(9.27)

19.156
(3.41)
-14.709
(-3.18)
-13.929
(-8.62)

17.570
(3.11)
-23.654
(-4.31)
-13.863
(-8.58)
4.20
(3.01

12.808
(2.20)
-28.957
(-5.21)
-12.735
(-7.85)
1.892
(1.28)
21.906
(4.24)

-1.577
(-1.60)

EmploymentAccess
Percent-Poverty
Percent-College
Graduate
PercentMinority
Disadvantage
Percent-NotBorn
US
Housing-Price
Residual

-0.039
(-0.24)
-1.772
(-11.19)
-0.361
(-8.12)
0.053
(1.22)
1.268
(7.49)

EmploymentAccess
Percent-Poverty
Percent-College
Graduate
PercentMinority
Disadvantage
Percent-NotBorn
US
Housing-Price
Residual

Plus Percent
not born in
U.S.

-3.217
(-3.11)

13.136
(4.39)

0.303
(0.21)
Weekly Hours Last Year
20.378
(4.47)
8.823
(2.25)

7.270
(3.76)

8.628
(4.38)

7.794
(3.88)

36.068
(7.42)
6.027
(1.52)
-17.186
(-11.93)

34.843
(7.14)
-0.474
(-0.10)
-17.202
(-11.88)
2.995
(2.35)

28.495
(5.64)
-7.005
(-1.43)
-15.898
(-10.97)
0.094
(0.07)
28.035
(5.89)

-3.830
(-4.19)

-1.890
(-1.86)

0.454
(0.36)
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11.685
(7.33)

12.837
(7.84)

12.136
(7.16)

Variables
EmploymentAccess
Percent-Poverty
Percent-College
Graduate
Housing-Market
Residual

EmploymentAccess
Percent-Poverty
Percent-College
Graduate
Housing-Price
Residual

EmploymentAccess
Percent-Poverty
Percent-College
Graduate
Housing-Price
Residual

Variables
EmploymentAccess
Percent-Poverty
Percent-College
Graduate
Housing-Stock
Index
Housing-Market
Residual

Table 8: Relationship between Neighborhood and Capital Income
Positive Capital Income
Capital Income Above $1,000
Capital Income Above $3,000
OLS
Final IV Model
OLS
Final IV Model
OLS
Final IV Model
0.079
0.159
0.034
0.158
0.045
0.143
(3.82)
(0.41)
(4.70)
(0.19)
(5.19)
(0.26)
-0.058
-0.042
0.065
0.012
0.152
-0.127
(-3.33)
(-0.38)
(-1.22)
(0.46)
(0.38)
(1.10)
0.051
0.043
.0002
0.026
-0.034
0.084
(6.40)
(0.88)
(3.63)
(0.01
(2.40)
(0.64)
0.038
0.058
-0.004
(-0.06)
(0.64)
(1.01

Table 9: Core and Supplemental Models of Labor Models Outcomes
Core Labor Market Outcomes
Labor Force Participant
Weeks Worked Last Year
Average Hours per Week Last
Year
OLS
Final IV Model
OLS
Final IV Model
OLS
Final IV Model
19.156
-1.501
36.068
0.006
0.308
1.769
(2.83)
(3.41)
(-2.68)
(7.42)
(0.32)
(2.02)
-14.709
-3.550
6.027
-0.528
-1.055
-11.176
(-15.03)
(-3.18)
(-5.14)
(1.52)
(-20.62)
(-8.29)
-13.929
1.264
-17.186
-0.099
-0.434
-2.397
(-12.26)
(-8.62)
(6.11)
(-11.93)
(-15.01
(-9.71)
11.685
0.514
7.270
(3.76)
(7.33)
(9.48)
Supplemental Labor Market Outcomes
Worked Last Year
Employment Last Week
Hours Worked Last Week
OLS
Final IV Model
OLS
Final IV Model
OLS
Final IV Model
0.647
0.013
0.362
-1.324
44.266
-0.004
(-0.25)
(3.98)
(1.17)
(3.10)
(-2.20)
(8.34)
-1.308
-0.146
-0.337
-4.498
1.906
-0.661
(-24.91)
(-9.46)
(-9.14)
(-3.32)
(-5.86)
(0.42)
-0.603
0.009
-0.258
0.646
-19.296
-0.067
(-10.45)
(-12.59)
(2.63)
(-7.96)
(2.89)
(-12.25)
0.201
12.920
0.704
(11.70)
(4.92)
(7.27)

Table 10: Incorporation of Neighborhood Housing Stock Controls
Labor Force Participant
Weeks Worked Last Year
Average Hours per Week Last Year
Final IV Model
Control for
Final IV Model
Control for
Final IV Model
Control for
Housing Stock
Housing Stock
Housing Stock
19.156
20.941
36.068
38.235
0.308
0.591
(3.84)
(3.41)
(3.68)
(7.42)
(7.70)
(2.02)
-14.709
-14.580
6.027
5.862
-1.055
-1.079
(-8.60)
(-3.18)
(-3.18)
(1.52)
(1.49)
(-8.29)
-13.929
-15.650
-17.186
-19.122
-0.434
-0.633
(-12.36)
(-8.62)
(-8.97)
(-11.93)
(-11.92)
(-9.71)
4.350
5.021
0.622
(10.21)
(2.25)
(2.58)
7.270
8.277
11.685
12.564
0.514
0.595
(11.43)
(3.76)
(4.48)
(7.33)
(8.14)
(9.48)
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